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Abstract 
Thls paper concerns the use of soclal indicators to improve social development and the 
happiness of populations. A distinction will be drawn between the traditional indicators of 
wealth and health and the new subjective social indicators. These latter measures concern the 
subjective side of life quality, or happmess, which m contemporary science is more 
commonly referred to as subjective wellbeing (SWB). The SWB construct is described wlthm 
the theoretical context of SWB homeostasis. This is a proposed management system which 
has the role of mamtammg a pOSitive view of the self. It will be described how the 
homeostatic system can be challenged by hardship and defended by a variety of resources. 
Recommended forms of SWB measurement will be considered. It is concluded that both 
objective and subjective social indicators should be consulted by policy makers in order to 
plan the most effective initiahves to enhance population wellbeing. 
Introduction 
The history of Social Indicators has been well described (Land, 1983; Land, Lamb, Meadows, 
& Taylor, 2007; Noll & Zapf, 1994). The term arose in the early 1960s. At that time, the 
American Space Program was starting to become the focus of much attention and resource 
consumptlOn. So the American Academy of Arts and SClences, acting for the NatlOnal 
Aeronautics and Space Admmlstration, decided to measure the consequences of this program 
for American society. The results were published in a report (Brauer, 1966) bearing the name 
Social Indlcators and this included the following definition: 
" ... social indicators - statishcs, statistical series, and all other forms of evidence - that 
enable us to assess where we stand and are going with respect to our values and goals ... " 
(Brauer, 1966, p. 1). 
This pubhcation heralded a new awareness, that the wellbemg of populations was more than 
simply the amount of money in circulation. Subsequent publicatlOns took up this theme and 
noted the need to develop formal measurement systems for these new indicators (see e.g. 
NatlOnal Commission on Technology, Automation and Economlc Progress, 1966; Sheldon & 
Moore, 1968). The need for the new measures was also emphasized by Toward a Soclal 
Report which had been commissioned by the Johnson admmistration. Its seven chapters 
addressed major area of social concern as health and illness; social mobility; the phYSical 
environment; income and poverty; public order and safety; leammg, science, and art; and 
participation and alienation. It also included the following definition: 
"A soclal indicator ... may be defined to be a statistic of direct normative interest which 
facilitates concise, comprehensive and balanced judgments about the condition of major 
aspects of a society." (US Department of Health, Education, Welfare (USDHEW), 1969, p. 
97) 
Thls definition is more expliclt than its predecessor. It introduces the idea that such indicators 
should be references to societal norms and that the results could have utility in making 
informed judgments about the allocation of resources to areas in deficit. Importantly, however, 
all of these advocated measures are tangible, objective mdicators. They constitute the counts, 
amounts and frequencies that economists, as the mandarins of national development, could 
accept as a natural extension of the wealth equation. Much harder to accept was the radical 
idea of subjective social indicators. However, evidence that such indicators mIght be useful 
was rapidly mounting. 
Just seven years following Olson's report, two extraordinary publications challenged the 
mono-dImensional, objective VIew oflife quality. In 1976 two independent research groups as 
Andrews and Withey (1976) and Campbell, Converse, and Rodgers (1976) published reports 
that concentrated on: 
"-- the experience oflife rather than the conditions oflife ... [we] define the quality of 
life experience mainly in terms of satisfaction [with life and specific life domains]." 
(Campbell et al., 1976, pp. 7, 9). 
Both texts demonstrated that sUbjective data, regarding the personal sense of 
satisfaction with life, could be reliably measured and analyzed using ordinary linear 
statistics. Moreover the results they produced were very interesting. Of particular 
importance was their finding that measures of SWB are remarkably stable. It is this 
stability and reliability of measurement that has made SWB such an attractive new 
area for quantitative investigation. 
Some 30 years later, in 2007, it is becoming increasingly accepting that both 
the traditional objective and the new subjective indicators have a role to play in the 
determination of life quality. Led by the example of the tiny Kingdom of Bhutan, 
policy makers have come to realize that, while economic development is important, so 
too is the happiness of citizens. A contented populace is advantaged in many ways 
over one that is not. Happy citizens create more social capital, work harder, are 
healthier, and are more self-sufficient (for a review of the advantages that happiness 
bestows see Lyubomirsky, King, and Diener (2005). Thus, in order to consider these 
new developments, in April 2007 the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
convened an international conference titled 'Is happiness measurable and what do 
those measures mean for policy?' (Griffoin, 2007). Other august financial institutions 
are showing a similar level of interest. In January of this year Hoornweg, Ruiz Nunez, 
Freire, Palugyai, Villaveces, Herrera (2007) produced a report for the World Bank 
entitled "City Indicators: Now to Nanjing" which recommends, inter alia, using the 
Personal Wellbeing Index to measure happiness. 
Governments are also showing increasing interest in the subjective indicators 
of life quality. This follows from undrstanding that the promotion of happiness among 
their citizens is important from both a humanitarian and a productivity viewpoint. The 
UK Government's Sustainable Development Strategy, 'Securing the Future', commits 
the Government to get a better understanding and focus on well-being and happiness 
(Dolan, Peasgood, & White, 2006). The Canadian International Development Agency 
(2005) has now sponsored two international conferences on Gross National Happiness. 
While the Government of Malaysia, through its Ministry of Women, Family and 
Community Development (2007), is committed to strengthening and promotion of 
family well-being. 
But what is the meaning behind such words as happiness, life quality and 
wellbeing? The manner in which these constructs are operationalised and understood 
within the scientific community will now be considered. 
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Subjective wellbeing 
The problems with terminology have been serious from the start. Even as the early 
researchers used the term 'happiness' to describe the area of their study, they 
recognized that the term was ambiguous. For example, Fordyce (1983) grapples with 
his use of the term describing 'happiness' as 'an emotional sense of well-being ----
that goes by many names (contentment, fulfillment, self-satisfaction, joy, peace of 
mind, etc.)'. The problem that Fordyce recognized is that, in common English usage, 
happiness generally refers to a state of mind that has been caused by an acute 
experience, such a having a cup of tea on a hot day. But this is not what the wellbeing 
researchers generally intend to measure. They strive to measure a dispositional state 
of happiness that is much more stable. So in order to make this distinction, 'trait' or 
'dispositional' happiness has come to be known as Subjective Wellbeing (SWB) in 
order to reduce terminological confusion. 
Measuring SWB in a consistent manner has also posed a challenge. Not 
surprisingly, in the presence of terminological confusion, opinions vary as to what 
should be measured. Moreover, a surprisingly high proportion of researchers find it 
necessary to invent their own scale. The result is a huge legacy of instruments. The 
Australian Centre on Quality of Life (ACQOL, 2007) lists many hundreds of scales 
that purport to measure SWB in one form or another. This has greatly limited progress 
in understanding SWB since these scales are of very mixed psychometric quality and 
many of them measure quite different constructs. The unfortunate result is a confused 
and massive literature that, despite three decades of research, still lacks simple 
conceptual cohesion. 
No doubt these difficulties have contributed to the limited acceptance among 
policy makers in adopting SWB as a guide to life quality. However, despite the 
difficulties of conceptualization and measurement, SWB is gaining prominence as an 
important new facet of the human condition. After all, there can surely be little 
purpose in life if people feel their lives are not worth living. And a most important 
truth is that the objective measures of wealth and health cannot be used as proxy 
measures of SWB. For example, there is generally a low correlation between 
objectively measured physical health and SWB (Cummins, Woerner, Tomyn, Gibson, 
& Knapp, 2006) provided that the people concerned have the resources to deal with 
the consequences of their poor health for daily living. 
So, there is now agreement that the totality of life quality must be measured in 
two dimensions. The objective and the subjective measures provide important and 
different views. Which view is most relevant to policy makers will depend, to some 
extent, on the population concerned. In the context of North America, authors such as 
Schalock (1997) consider it is how people feel about their life quality that is the 
ultimate test of a life worth living. And certainly in circumstances where basic 
material needs are met, as is most common within that society, authors generally 
agree that life quality can be most meaningfully assessed by subjective variables (e.g. 
Cummins, 2000a; Headey, 1981; Spilker, 1990). However, in countries such as 
Taiwan, where it is more common for people to lack the physical resources that they 
need to maintain life quality, measuring their objective circumstances is also crucial 
to understanding the relative areas of need. Importantly, when the objective 
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circumstances of living are very tough, they defeat our capacity to defend our sense of 
wellbeing and SWB falls below its normal levels. When this occurs, people are at 
high risk of depression and their functioning is severely impaired. So, understanding 
the relationship between the objective circumstances of living and SWB management 
is important from a public health perspective. This understanding is assisted by the 
theory of SWB homeostasis. 
Subjective Wellbeing Homeostasis 
The theory of Subjective Wellbeing Homeostasis proposes that, in a manner 
analogous to the homeostatic maintenance of body temperature, subjective wellbeing 
is actively controlled and maintained (see Cummins & Nistico, 2002, for an extended 
description). SWB homeostasis is attempting to maintain a normal positive sense of 
wellbeing that is a generalized and rather abstract view of the self. It is exemplified by 
a response to the classic question "How satisfied are you with your life as a whole?" 
Given the extraordinary generality of this question, the response that people give does 
not represent a cognitive evaluation of their life. Rather it reflects a deep and stable 
positive mood state that we call Core Affect (Davern, Cummins, & Stokes, in press). 
This is a mood state that is dominated by a sense of contentment flavored with a touch 
of happiness and alertness. It is this general and abstract state of subjective wellbeing 
which the homeostatic system seeks to defend. As one consequence, the level of 
satisfaction people record to this question has the following characteristics: 
1. It is normally very stable. While unusually good or bad events will cause it to 
change in the short term, over a period of time homeostasis will normally 
return SWB to its previous level (see Hanestad & Albrektsen, 1992; Headey & 
Wearing, 1989). 
2. Each person has a level of Core Affect that is set genetically. This 'set-point' 
for SWB lies in the 'satisfied' sector of the dissatisfied-satisfied continuum. 
That is, on a scale where zero represents complete dissatisfaction with life and 
100 represents complete satisfaction, people's set-point normally lies within 
the range of about 60 - 90 points (see Cummins, Gullone, & Lau, 2002). 
3. At a population level within Western nations, the average set-point is 75. In 
other words, on average, people feel that their general satisfaction with life is 
about three-quarters of its maximum extent (Cummins, 1995, 1998). 
While this generalized sense of wellbeing is held positive with remarkable 
tenacity, it is not immutable. A sufficiently adverse environment can defeat the 
homeostatic system and, when this occurs, the level of subjective wellbeing falls 
below its homeostatic range. For example, people who experience strong, chronic 
pain from arthritis or from the stress of caring for a severely disabled family member 
at home have low levels of subjective wellbeing (Cummins, 2001). However, for 
people who are maintaining a normally functioning homeostatic system, their levels 
of SWB will show little relationship to normal variations in their chronic 
circumstances of living. 
So, how does homeostasis manage to defend SWB against the unusually good 
and the unusually bad experiences of life? The answer we propose is that there are 
two levels of defense and we call these defensive systems 'buffers'. One set of buffers 
is external to the person and the other internal. 
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Homeostatic buffers 
Interaction with the environment constantly threatens to move wellbeing up or 
down in sympathy with momentary positive and negative experience. And to some 
extent this does occur. However, most people are adept at avoiding strong challenges 
through the maintenance of established life routines that make their daily experiences 
predictable and manageable. Under such ordinary life conditions, the level of the 
mood-state varies by perhaps 10 percentage points or so from one moment to the next, 
and this is the Set-Point Range. Homeostasis works hardest at the edges of this range 
to prevent more drastic mood changes which, of course, also occur from time to time. 
Strong and unexpected positive or negative experience will shift the sense of personal 
wellbeing to abnormally higher or lower values, usually for a brief period, until 
adaptation occurs. However, if the negative experience is sufficiently strong and 
sustained, homeostasis will lack the power to restore equilibrium and SWB will 
remain below its set-point range. Such homeostatic defeat is marked by a sustained 
loss of positive mood and a high risk of depression. 
So the first line of defense for homeostasis is to avoid, or at least rapidly 
attenuate, negative environmental interactions. This is the role of the external buffers. 
External buffers 
The two most important sources for the defence of our SWB are close 
relationships and money. Of these two, the most powerful buffer is a relationship with 
another human being that involves mutual sharing of intimacies and support 
(Cummins, Walter, & Woerner, 2007, Report 16.1). Almost universally, the research 
literature attests to the power of such relationships to moderate the influence of 
potential stressors on SWB (for reviews see Henderson, 1977; Sarason, Sarason, & 
Pierce, 1990). 
Money is also a very important external buffer, but there are misconceptions 
as to what money can and cannot do in relation to personal wellbeing. For example, it 
cannot shift the set-point to create a perpetually happier person. Set-points for SWB 
are proposed to be under genetic control (Braungart, Plomin, DeFries, & Fulker, 
1992; Lykken & Tellegen, 1996), so in this sense money cannot buy happiness. No 
matter how rich someone is, their average level of SWB cannot be sustained higher 
than one that approximates the top of their set-point range. People adapt readily to 
luxurious living standards, so genetics trumps wealth after a certain level of income 
has been achieved. This understanding is support by the findings of a recent report. 
Cummins et aI., (2007) studied the cumulative data from the Australian Unity 
Wellbeing Index which comprises SWB data from about 30,000 Australians. The 
purpose of the analysis was to determine the demographic groups with the highest and 
the lowest wellbeing. It is reported that the maximum average subgroup score is 81.0 
points on a 0-100 scale. Thus, this seems to be the maximum SWB that can be 
maintained as a group average even for people who have close relationships and 
plenty of money. 
The true power of wealth is to protect wellbeing through its capacity to be 
used as a highly flexible resource (Cummins, 2000b) that allows people to defend 
themselves against the negative potential inherent within their environment. Wealthy 
people pay others to perform tasks they do not wish to do themselves. Poor people, 
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who lack such resources, must fend for themselves to a much greater extent. Poor 
people, therefore, have a level of SWB that is far more at the mercy of their 
environment. They are, therefore, more likely to experience homeostatic defeat. 
Internal buffers 
When we fail to control our external environment and SWB is threatened, our 
internal buffers come into play. These comprise protective cognitive devices that are 
designed to minimize the impact of personal failure on our positive feelings about our 
self. There are many such devices, collectively called Secondary Control techniques 
(Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982) and a detailed discussion of these systems in 
relation to SWB is provided in Cummins and Nistico (2002) and Cummins, et a1., 
(2002).They have the role of protecting SWB against the conscious reality of life 
through adaptation. They do this by altering the way we see ourselves in relation to 
some challenging agent, such that the negative potential in the challenge is deflected 
away from the core view of self. So the role of these buffers is mainly to minimize the 
impact of personal failure. The ways of thinking that can achieve this are highly 
varied. For example, one can find meaning in the event ('God is testing me'), fail to 
take responsibility for the failure ('it was not my fault') or regard the failure [dropping 
a vase] as unimportant ('I did not need that old vase anyway'). 
In summary, the combined external and internal buffers ensure that our 
wellbeing is robustly defended. There is, therefore, considerable stability in the SWB 
of populations and, as has been stated, the mean for Western societies like Australia 
are consistently at about 75 points on a 0 to 100 scale. In non-Western countries the 
same kind of SWB stability can be expected, however the population mean score may 
be different due to cultural response bias. 
Cross-cultural differences 
Within the Western media is common to find reports that present comparative 
lists of SWB or happiness between countries. Inevitably the authors assume that the 
measures they are reporting are valid between cultures such that the differences 
represent meaningful international comparisons of life quality. This assumption is 
incorrect and simplistic. There are two reasons. The first is the simple problem of 
translation - that there is often no simple equivalence between the terms used to 
describe affective states in different languages. The second reason is more important 
and concerns cultural response bias. Such bias has been well documented (e.g. Lee, 
Jones, Mineyama, & Zhang, 2002; Stening & Everett, 1984) and shows that when 
data are compared between equivalent demographic groups, people from East and 
South East Asian cultures are more reticent to rate themselves at the ends of the 
response scale when compared to people from countries like Australia. The reasons 
for this, as documented by Lau, Cummins and McPherson (2005) among Hong Kong 
Chinese people, are a combination of modesty, concern at tempting the fates by rating 
oneself too high, and having a different view of what the maximum scale score 
represents. The result of this response bias is to lower the overall average score 
because more very high scores, which are generally far more common than very low 
scores, are missing from the database. The operation of this bias then gives the 
appearance that, on average, the people from these countries have lower levels of 
SWB than do people from Western countries. While this may indeed be the case, due 
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to differential living standards, the simple comparison is contaminated by response 
bias. 
Response bias and living standards 
The initial report that combined population mean scores to produce a 'Gold 
Standard' of 70-80 points for SWB (Cummins, 1995), used data only from Western 
countries. When non-Western countries were included (Cummins, 1998) it became 
evident that this combination produced far higher variation in SWB (60-80 points). 
This is hardly surprising. Countries differ in both wealth and culture, and SWB is 
sensitive to both types of influence. Figure 2 shows the relationship between national 
wealth and SWB. 
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Figure 1. The relationship between SWB and GNP by country 
This Figure (World Bank, 1997) shows Subjective Wellbeing plotted against 
the level of economic development. To measure SWB these researchers used 
the 4-point response scale of: Very happy, Quite happy, Not very happy, Not 
at all happy. The following can be noted: 
(a) While there is a strong overall relationship between national wealth 
and SWB, this relationship is clearly not linear. 
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(b) The countries with incomes <$5,000 vary widely in SWB and yet there 
is no simple relationship between their SWB and wealth. This indicates 
that population SWB can be heavily influenced by many other factors 
such as civil disturbance, food shortage, disease, bad governance, etc. 
SWB may also vary according to culture. 
The difficulties of dealing with the combination of cultural response bias 
and lower living standards are demonstrated in the study by Lau et ai. (Lau et aI., 
2005) who compared the SWB of Hong Kong Chinese and Australians. Apart from 
differences in the cultural response bias between these two countries, the lowest 
incomes in Hong Kong are relatively much lower that they are in Australia. This can 
be seen from the respective Gini Coefficients as Hong Kong 52.5 and Australia 35.2 
(United Nations, 2006). So the comparative SWB data will reflect both of these two 
influences as follows: 
1. Because people in Hong Kong will be avoiding the ends of the response 
scale, the cultural response bias will tend to truncate the distribution, 
making it more leptokurtic. The result will be a smaller standard 
distribution and a reduced mean score because the effect will be most 
evident at the top of the distribution. 
2. Because more people in Hong Kong will be in economic distress, this 
will tend to extend the distribution downwards, making the data more 
negatively skewed. In tum, this will tend to decrease the mean and raise 
the standard deviation. 
In summary, the mean score should be less in Hong Kong due to the 
combined influences of the response bias and income inequality. The standard 
deviation, on the other hand, should remain much the same due to the opposing forces. 
And this is what was found. The mean SWB was higher for the Australians and there 
was no difference in the standard deviations of the two samples. We conclude that this 
is evidence of a cultural response bias because the effects of the income inequality 
alone would act to both reduce the mean and extend the standard deviation. 
What is clear from this account is that the interpretation of international 
SWB comparisons must be done very cautiously. But of greater interest to many 
countries is the change in their average SWB over time. Since such within-country 
comparisons will necessarily hold cultural response bias constant, changes over time 
will reflect the relative ability of the population to manage their wellbeing and, in 
particular, the proportion of the population who are suffering homeostatic failure. So 
let me now consider the process of measuring SWB in an international context. 
Measuring subjective wellbeing 
The Directory of Instruments available through the Australian Centre on 
Quality of Life (ACQOL, 2007) lists over 700 scales that purport to measure some 
aspect of life quality. Most claim to measure wellbeing in some form. So how can a 
researcher make a choice from such a daunting list? The answer is to know what it is 
that needs to be measured, and so from the perspective of SWB that has given in this 
paper there are three scales that I recommend. 
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The first is one of the oldest. It is the single question 'How satisfied are you 
with your life as a whole?' (Andrews & Withey, 1976). This question perfectly fulfills 
the criteria for an item measuring SWB to be both personal and abstract. No one can 
compute the answer to the question in terms of cognition. So it is answered in 
reference to the ongoing mood state, which normally approximates the set-point core 
affect (Davern et aI., in press). The drawback to using this question, however, is that it 
is a single item. As such it is not as reliable as a multi-item scale, so two alternative 
scales have been devised. 
The first is the most widely used index of SWB, the Satisfaction with Life 
Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985). This scale is designed to measure 
global life satisfaction through five items, each of which involves an overall judgment 
of life in general. The scores from these items are then summed as a measure of SWB. 
For a copy of the scale go to http://s.psych.uiuc.edu/~ediener/hottopic/hottopic.htm1. 
The importance of the SWLS is that it represents an expanded version of 'life 
as a whole'. The items are not designed to give individual insights into the structure of 
SWB. This differs from the second scale to be recommended. The Personal Wellbeing 
Index (International Wellbeing Group, 2006) has a quite different design as the 'first-
level deconstruction' of life as a whole. It contains eight items, referred to as 
'domains', where each item represents a broad, semi-abstract area of life. The 
theoretical basis for the PWI is that the domains together describe the experience of 
overall life satisfaction. Empirically they tend to explain about 50 - 60 percent of the 
variance in 'life as a whole'. The manual is available from (International Wellbeing 
Group, 2006). 
The PWI is designed to be a 'work in progress', with the scale evolving as 
new data show ways for it to be successfully modified. The International Wellbeing 
Group oversights this evolution and the eighth domain of SpirituallReligious 
satisfaction was added to the scale in 2006. 
The disadvantage of the PWI over the SWLS is that, because the domains are 
slightly more specific in their focus, they are also slightly more distant from the mood 
state of core affect. The advantage of the PWI is that each of the domains carries its 
own information concerning a broad aspect of life. Because of this, the scale can be 
analyzed at either the level of individual domains or at the level of a single combined 
score. A further advantage of the PWI is that there are parallel versions for adults who 
have a cognitive or intellectual disability, school children and pre-school children 
(International Wellbeing Group, 2006). 
Diagnostic ranges 
A unique feature of the PWI is the use of data as a diagnostic indicator of 
homeostatic failure. There are two major ways in which such data can be informative. 
The first is at the level of individuals and the second is at the level of popUlation 
groups. 
SWB can be individually diagnostic of homeostatic failure because individuals 
have set-points within the positive range. While people with high levels of wellbeing 
will have varying cultural biases towards positioning themselves at the top of a range, 
the cultural bias will not prevent the normal person from responding that they feel 
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positive about their life. However, in attempting to interpret individual scores there 
are three factors to be considered. These are the set-point, which lies somewhere in 
the positive range between 60 and 90 points, the set-point range which extends about 
5 points on either side of the set-point, and the chronic negative life experiences that 
are challenging homeostatic control. The combination of these forces acts as follows. 
1. The set-point for any individual will lie between 60-90 points. 
2. Acute variation within the highest and lowest set-points will extend this 
normal range to about 55-95 points. Thus, all normal-range scores lie in 
the positive range of 50-100. Importantly therefore, individual scores 
below 50 are diagnostic of homeostatic failure and a high risk of 
depression. 
The interpretation of sample mean scores can be done in two ways. The first is 
similar to that of the individual scores. Because individual SWB scores are normally 
positive, sample mean scores will normally lie well above 50 points. Moreover, the 
closer that sample means get to 50 points, the greater the proportion of the sample 
suffering homeostatic defeat. If sample mean scores lie below 50 points then a 
majority of the people in the groups will be at high risk of depression. 
The second method of interpretation is against local normative data. Such 
norms can be created by using the means scores from multiple popUlation surveys. If 
these multiple mean scores are used as data, a normative range for mean scores can be 
calculated as two standard deviations on either side of the grand mean. Then, any 
subsequent sample mean that falls outside this range can be judged as abnormal. 
The use of such normative ranges for sample means can be seen within 
Report 16.0 of the Australian Unity Wellbeing Index (Cummins et aI., 2006). Here the 
mean scores from16 consecutive surveys are combined to provide normative ranges 
for the population as a whole. Additional normative ranges are also calculated for 
demographic groups, such as those determined by gender, age and income. The 
calculation of such ranges allows the detection of population sub-groups that fall 
below the national average. This allows the identification of areas within the 
population who are most in need of additional assistance, and so informs policy 
decisions concerning the distribution of resources. 
Summary 
In order to make a comprehensive assessment of life quality within a nation, it 
is necessary to employ both objective and subjective indicators. Both kinds of 
measure provide different and useful information for policy planners. The major 
usefulness of SWB measurement is as an indication of homeostatic failure and risk of 
depression. It is, thus, a useful measure to identify areas of relative need and also as a 
way of tracking the effectiveness of Government interventions that involve the 
allocation of resources. Giving attention to the resources necessary to maintain 
normative SWB for disadvantaged population sub-groups may be one of the most 
effective initiatives to enhance popUlation wellbeing and social development. 
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